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ABSTRACT
The shift of the Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) from the poverty-
lending approach to the financial system approach is likely to
have two counterbalancing effects on the social mission of
poverty alleviation and women empowerment. On the one
hand – and as is desirable – financial sustainability could cause
MFIs to increase the depth and breadth of their outreach. But on
the other hand – and possibly at the cost of the social mission –
financial sustainability may become the core objective of the
MFIs. The aim of this paper is to investigate which of the two out-
comes is most likely in MFIs following the financial system
approach. For this purpose, the paper first develops a theoretical
framework to deduce testable hypotheses. The hypotheses are
then tested with data from 158 rated MFIs, using various panel
data estimation techniques. Results obtained thus reveal that
majority of the MFIs in developing countries hold some market
power. Besides, we find that financial sustainability is at odds
with the social mission of alleviating poverty and empowering
women and does not translate into depth and breadth of out-
reach. The study also discusses some policy implications of
the results.
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1. Introduction
The arrival of microfinance institutions to alleviate human miseries in the early 1980s
was revolutionary. The focus of these institutions was to provide credit, at conces-
sionary rates and without collateral requirements, to the poor so that they could start
their own tiny income generating activities (Arun, 2005; Hulme & Mosley, 1996;
Morduch, 2000; Robinson, 2001). This approach, called welfarist or the poverty-lend-
ing approach, helped the rural poor to improve and sustain the lives of their children
and of the whole family. But since the lifeline of the welfarist approach was donor
funds and government subsidies, it was felt that such institutions are not sustainable
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in the longer run. Hence, the institutionalist approach emerged which champions
self-sustained credit programs for the poor (Morduch, 2000). The institutional
approach to microcredit is based on market-based lending and is presumed to be
superior to the welfarist approach in meeting the ever-growing demand for
microcredit.
No doubt the commercial MFIs performed much better than the welfarist ones in
meeting growing demands and providing larger loans (Chahine & Tannir, 2010). But
commercialisation also necessarily meant a shift from serving the poor to acquiring
profits (Christen & Cook, 2000; Armendariz & Labie, 2011; Bateman, 2010; Khan,
Shaorong & Ullah, 2017) as both cannot be achieved simultaneously (Robinson, 2001),
a fact that is well documented in recent literature1. This is so because an MFI, in the
absence of subsidies and donations, can only achieve the twin goals of sustainability
and outreach if it earns more profits (Cull, Demirg€uÇ-Kunt & Morduch, 2007;
Morduch, 2000). More profits, in turn, can be appropriated by having and retaining
more clients or by charging higher markup rates. An MFI would opt for higher
markup rates to increase its profit if demand for microcredit is less elastic and the con-
verse is compatible for markets where demand for microcredit is more elastic (Khan,
Shaorong & Khan, 2015). The former is a characteristic of non-contestable markets
while the latter is a characteristic of perfect markets. However, ‘credit without collateral
requirements’ may still be attractive enough to counterbalance the impact of higher
than the market markup rates. And given this attractiveness, an MFI may find it opti-
mal to attract un-bankable wealthy clients2 (Armendariz & Labie, 2011), to concentrate
their operations in urban areas (Mersland & Strøm, 2010) or to concentrate on other
less risky clientele3. All such outcomes are definite drifts from the original mission of
MFIs and are largely facilitated by the market conditions in which an MFI operates.
Since the pursuit of profit (which we call the weaker notion of sustainability) is a
prime reason behind mission drift, and that more profits can be appropriated in
more concentrated markets, an examination of the market conditions would better
facilitate to know where mission drift is probable and where it is not. Thus, the paper
first presents theoretical linkages between financial sustainability, market conditions
and microfinance mission drift. The theoretical discussion is then used to develop
several testable hypotheses, all related to the core objectives of the paper. The derived
hypotheses are then empirically tested by utilising data on 158 rated MFIs obtained
from the Mix Market. To achieve the stated objectives, the rest of the paper is organ-
ised as follows; Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 explains
data and methodology employed to draw inferences regarding the presence of market
power and mission drift in the microfinance markets. Section 4 present results and
discussions. Section 5 concludes the paper with some policy recommendations.
2. Literature review
Economists always use the degree of competition to meter market efficiency. Competition,
however, in the microfinance industry is multi-faceted and may or may not lead to effi-
cient solutions. Before 90 s and in the old poverty-lending approach, MFIs competed
for donor funds and government subsidies (Assefa, Hermes & Meesters, 2013).
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Such competition is likely to cause inefficiency which is proved both in theory
(see for example Rose-Ackerman, 1982 and Aldeshev & Verdier, 2006) and by
empirical studies (see for example Cooley & Ron, 2002 and Ly & Mason, 2012).
Competition for funding usually distorts incentives and MFIs are more likely to
focus on things other than their original mission of poverty alleviation. In such
case, a monopoly solution may be optimal (McIntosh & Wydick, 2005).
The nature of competition in microfinance industry somehow changed, but not
entirely, in the new financial-lending approach (Assefa, Hermes & Meesters, 2013)
and so does its theoretical implications. Theory and empirics have produced mixed
results if competition is analyzed from investor’s and MFIs perspective. For example,
the theoretical results of McIntosh & Wydick (2005) views competition for external
funding, even in the new wave MFIs, as inefficient while the study of Ghosh and Van
Tassel (2013) views this type of competition as welfare enhancing. But from the per-
spective of clients, there is consensus that competition enables MFIs to provide a
complete package of better financial services. Competition also helps to achieve depth
of outreach. However, even this type of competition is not without disadvantages. For
example, competition might cause MFIs to lower price and subsequently its profit-
ability (McIntosh & Wydick, 2005). Competition also provides clients with multiple
loan opportunities from different MFIs which may decrease client’s repayment pros-
pects and hence the financial status of MFIs. Thus, theoretically, competition has
both positive and negative consequences for MFIs performance.
The switch over of MFIs from the old poverty-lending approach to the new finan-
cial system approach was incited by the well-known ‘win-win’ proposition (Robinson,
2001). Given the unpredictable nature of donor funds/government subsidies, MFIs
following the old poverty-lending approach were neither sustainable, nor these could
significantly increase the net of beneficiaries. Thus, as is believed, the commercial
lending would make the MFIs financially sustainable, as well as would increase both
depth and breadth of their outreach. Notwithstanding the very weak notion of sus-
tainability, empirical studies can be classified in two groups; studies that test whether
the ‘win-win’ proposition is a reality or a myth, and studies that identify factors lead-
ing to MFIs financial sustainability. Some of the well-known recent studies that claim
the ‘win-win’ proposition to be a reality are; Christen & Cook (2000), Christen and
Drake (2002), and Ayele (2015). However, the volume of studies claiming a trade-off
between financial sustainability and outreach far outnumber the proponents of the
‘win-win’ proposition. These studies include; Conning (1999), Murdoch (2000), Cull
et al., (2007), Hermes, Lensink & Meesters (2011), Hudon & Traca (2011), and
Annim (2012).
The second strand of studies which only concerns financial sustainability of MFIs
include USAID report by Christen et al., (1995) and Ayayi & Sene (2010). The first
study reports that financial sustainability is possible only when interest rate controls
are not in operation. According to the second study, high interest rate correlates posi-
tively while percentage of female borrows correlates negatively with MFIs financial
sustainability. The joint message of these studies is that an MFI pursuing financial
sustainability will have to systematically avoid female borrowers and charge higher
interest rate. In effect, these results also show that the sceptics of the ‘win-win’
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proposition are right, and that financial sustainability is at odds with social sustain-
ability (Jackson, 2016).
Besides the above referred studies, a number of empirical studies scales the impact
of competition on MFIs performance (e.g., McIntosh and Wydicks 2005; Mersland
and Strøm 2010 and Navajas, et al., 2003), but to the best of our knowledge, competi-
tion in the microfinance industry has never been linked with mission drift. Moreover,
and what makes this study unique, this would be the first study to link sustainability,
competition and mission drift in the microfinance industry.
3.1. Theoretical framework
In the contemporary world, a firm is sustainable if it is commercially successful, has
no negative effects on the environment and operates in a sustainable society (Bocken,
Short, Rana & Evans, 2014; Stubbs & Cocklin, 2008). Unfortunately, the term covers,
at best, financial sustainability whenever it is used with reference to MFIs (e.g.,
Christen et al., 1995; and Ayayi & Sene, 2010)4. By connecting pieces of economic
theory, it can be shown that it is this weak notion of sustainability, facilitated by
market power that causes microfinance institutions to divert from their original
mission of poverty alleviation and women empowerment.
To formalise things, let l be the output produced by a representative MFI5, r be
the price charged for its output l, and cðlÞ be the cost of producing l. The weak
notion of sustainability, i.e., financial sustainability, implies that our representative
MFI would be sustainable if and only if profits ðpÞ in the following equation6 are
positive (Ayayi & Sene, 2010; Christen, Rhyne & Vogel, 1995);
p ¼ r  l  c lð Þ (1)
An MFI following the financial system approach (weak notion of sustainability),
and assuming perfect markets, would choose l such that profits are maximised;
Max p
l0
¼ r  lcðlÞ (2)
The first order condition for an interior optimum is;




r ¼ oc lð Þ
ol
(4)
Where oc lð Þol is the marginal private cost (MPC) of producing l, and r is the per unit
price charged for the product. In competitive markets, r equals marginal private bene-
fits (MPB) accruing to the firm and hence the above optimality condition can be
written as;
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MPB ¼ MPC (5)
If the production of l carries no externalities, then the above solution is a cher-
ished one since; (a) it maximises both producers and consumers surplus, (b) price
is set at the marginal cost, (c) and production takes place at the lowest possible cost
(Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, 1995). But the production of l does carry with
itself a positive externality in the form of poverty alleviation and women empower-
ment and hence would be under produced (Jehle & Reny, 2011). Thus, under-
production is the only theoretical concern if microfinance firm operates in the ideal
market structure, but a concern serious enough to make the ‘win-win propos-
ition’ doubtful7.
The situation becomes even more worrisome if we assume monopoly power,
instead of competition, in the product market. The condition for equilibrium
output remains the same except that, under monopoly power, a firm’s MPB is
given by;
MPB ¼ r 1þ 1gr
h i
(6)
Where gr is the interest elasticity of micro loans. Hence the equilibrium condition




This last expression shows that, under monopoly power, an MFI will charge inter-
est on its advances based on the interest elasticity of microloans. That is, if demand
for microloans is interest inelastic (i.e., if grj j < 1 ), then an MFI will charge above
its MPC (Khan, Shaorong & Khan, 2015). Similarly, the other two properties of com-
petitive solution are no more guaranteed if the firm holds market power.
Comparatively then, the solution under perfectly competitive markets seems best
since it only involves under production of l.
The above discussion implies that providing microcredit under any assumed mar-
ket structure is problematic for achieving the social mission, but monopoly power
relatively taxes the already impoverished more severely than competition. Let us go
back to the ideal market structure but instead consider the broader notion of sustain-
ability. The broader notion of sustainability would require considering both private
and social impact of microcredit in the above calculus. Let us model the social impact
of microcredit as a positive externality (h) and let the utility of the clients is a positive
function of this externality;
u ¼ h hð Þ where ou
oh
> 0 (8)
Then an optimal solution would require producing levels of l and h such that
profit net of the positive impact of microcredit is maximised. That is8;
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Max p
l;h0
¼ ½r  l  cðl; hÞ þ hðhÞ (9)
The two first order conditions for an interior maximum are;






 oc l; hð Þ
oh
¼ 0 (11)
The first condition is the same as before (i.e., MPB¼MPC) but the second condi-
tion states that, in an optimum, the MPC of producing the positive externality must
equal the marginal social benefit. A profit maximiser firm will never take care of
equation 11, no matter what market structure the firm is operating in. But while a
firm in competitive market structure ignores equation 11, the same firm practice
markup pricing as well if given market power. Hence, this brief theoretical discussion
implies that the problems associated with the financial system approach directly stems
from the weak notion of sustainability which are further magnified by the market
power. Thus, we hypothesis the following;
Hypothesis A The weak notion of sustainability will inevitably cause MFIs to focus on
profit maximisation for its own sake rather than increasing depth and breadth
of outreach.
Hypothesis B MFIs are more financially sustainable the more they drift from their
original mission.
Hypothesis C Drift from the original mission, in turn, is facilitated by the
market conditions.
3.2. Data sources
To estimate the empirical models of this study, we have taken data from the Mix
Market which is a reliable source for data regarding MFIs. The Mix Market data set
includes information on more than 2000 rated MFIs from all six developing regions
of the world. The selection of MFIs for the present study is guided by two qualifica-
tions. First, data on all those MFIs are retrieved from the Mix Market data set which
follows the financial system approach. It means that the sample will include banks,
rural banks and non-banking financial intermediaries (NBFIs) while excluding Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs), credit unions and others. In the second qualifica-
tion, of the above stated MFIs, only those are selected for which data are available for
at least ten (10) years, ranging from 2000 to 2015. Thus, a total of 158 MFIs qualifies
for the analysis which are detailed in Table 1.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 2127
3.3. Analytical methodology
Given that we have 158 cross sections and 16-time series observations9 on each vari-
able of interest, the appropriate estimation technique is the use of panel data techni-
ques. Panel data estimation is usually considered an efficient method in handling
economic data. A general panel data model, assuming away any heterogeneity
amongst cross sections, can be specified as;
Yit ¼ cþ hXit þ eit (12)
Several panel data estimation techniques are available (e.g., pooled regression, fixed
effect models and random effect models) to estimate equation (12). The choice of a
particular estimation technique depends on how the error term in equation (12) is
specified. For example, if it is believed that omitted variables would affect the depend-
ent variable cross sectionally but not over time, then equation (12) becomes;
Yit ¼ hXit þ li þ Vit (13)
Alternatively, if the omitted variables affect the dependent variable over time but
not cross-sectionally, then equation 12 becomes;
Yit ¼ hXit þ lt þ Vit (14)
These specifications, which can also be generalised to account for both cross sec-
tional and time effects at the same time, can be estimated as fixed effect models.
A random effect model, on the other hand, can be specified as;
Yit ¼ cþ hXit þ di þ eit (15)
Or as;
Yit ¼ cþ hXit þ dt þ eit (16)
depending on whether we are assuming cross sectional variations or time series varia-
tions. Unlike fixed effect models, the random effect models can efficiently be esti-
mated with generalised least square method. The selection of a particular panel data
estimation method is usually based on the results of Hausman test. The null hypoth-
esis of the Hausman test is that the random effect estimation is consistent and effi-
cient. So, rejection of the null hypothesis would imply that fixed effect estimation is
consistent and efficient.
Table 1. Regional information of the MFIs included in the sample.
Region Number of countries Number of MFIS Percent
Africa 01 07 4.43
East Asia & the Pacific 02 24 15.19
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 03 35 22.15
Latin America & the Caribbean 05 53 33.54
South Asia 04 39 24.68
Totals 15 158 100
Source: The Mix Market (2016).
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As outlined in the introductory section, the purpose of this paper is to link market
conditions, sustainability and mission drift in the MF industry to derive and test
some meaningful hypothesis. Thus, to know whether MFIs in a specific country are
operating in competitive environment or have monopoly power, we use the Panzar
and Rosse (1982 & 1987) H-statistics. H-statistics has routinely been used to know
competitive environments in banking industry (Matthews, Murinde & Zhao, 2007)
and can be estimated as;









bilnXit þ li þ Vit (17)
Where ln REV is the revenue of the ith MFI at time t, Z is a vector of input prices
(labor, capital and funds), and X is a vector of control variables. These variables are
outlined and explained in Table 2. The H-statistics involves summing over pj . It is
customary to include unit prices of labour, capital and funds in the input price vector
Z. In the X-vector, we control for Gross National Income per Capita (GNIPC) of the
jth country and size (AS) of the ith MFI. Thus, the H-statistic is given by;
H ¼ pl þ pk þ pf (18)
Where pl; pk and pf are the elasticity of revenue with respect to labor, capital and
funds respectively. If H in equation (18) equals 1, this means that MFIs in the jth
country are operating in a competitive environment. Alternatively, H  0, implies
monopoly and 0 < H < 1 implies monopolistic competition. Once estimating the
value of H, the paper then will utilise a Wald-type test to test various restrictions
Table 2. List of variables included in the analysis.
Variables Description Measure Source
Mission Drift MD PFB and ALS Mix Market
Female Borrowers PFB Percentage of women borrowers. Mix Market
Loan Size ALS Average Loan Size in US dollars. Mix Market
Assets AS Total Assets in US dollars. Mix Market
Cost per borrower CPB Ratio of operating expense to
Number of active borrower.
Mix Market
Number of active borrower NAB Number of active borrower who
have an outstanding loan
balance with MFIs.
Mix Market
Profit Margin PM Net operating income/
financial revenue
Mix Market




Contestability Index CI Estimated from equation 9 Own estimation





GNIPC Gross national income/
midyear population
Mix Market
Unit price of labor UPL Average salary Mix Market
Unit price of capital UPC Financial expenses/equity Mix Market
Unit price of funds UPF Financial expenses/borrowings Mix Market
Note: Variables marked () are not readily available in the Mix Market data set and are computed using vari-
ous relations.
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imposed upon H. Since there are 15 countries considered for the analysis, equation
(17) and (18) are estimated for each country separately.
Once done with estimating contestability index (CI) for all the fifteen countries,
the next step would be to know various covariates of mission drift in MFIs, CI being
one of these. For doing this, we will estimate variants of the following specification;
MDit ¼ sþ u1ASit þ u2CPBit þ u3NABit þ u4PMit þ u5LLRit þ u6CIit þ Uit (19)
Variables included in equation (19) are explained in Table 2.
In both empirical and theoretical literature (e.g., see Christen, Rhyne & Vogel
1995; and Ayayi & Sene, 2010], it is claimed that financial sustainability is essential
for both depth and breadth of outreach. As a next exercise, and to check the validity
of this claim, we also estimate the following equation;
PMit ¼ aþ c1ASit þ c2CPBit þ c3NABit þ c4LLRit þ c5CIit þ c6ALSit þ c7PFBit þ Uit
(20)
Variables included in equation (20) are also detailed in Table 2. The dependent
variable in equation (20) is the profit margin (PM) of the ith MFI which is consid-
ered as a proxy for financial sustainability.
This completes the econometric specifications needed for testing the three hypoth-
eses of section 3.1. While majority of the variables in equation (17), (19) and (20) are
included to serve the purpose of control, the rest of the variables are included for
specific purposes. For example, if the claim of increasing depth and breadth of out-
reach with increasing financial sustainability is not true, and assuming that female
borrowers are the poorest, then both c7 and c3 should be negative in equation (20)
(Hypothesis A)10. Hypothesis B can be tested either through equation (19) or equa-
tion (20). In equation (19), the relevant parameter is u4. Since we are using two dif-
ferent measures of mission drift, i.e., ALS and PFB, hence u4 should be positive in
equation (19) when ALS is used as a measure of mission drift, and negative when
PFB is used as a measure of mission drift11. To test hypothesis B using equation (20),
the relevant parameters are c6 and c7. If hypothesis B is true, then c6 should be posi-
tive and c7 negative in equation (20)
12. Similarly, hypothesis C can also be tested
using either equation (19) or (20). In equation (19), the relevant parameter is u6 and
in equation (20), the parameter of interest is c5. Again, given the two measures of
mission drift in equation (19), u6 should be negative when ALS is used as a measure
of MD and positive when PFB is used as a measure of mission drift13. The descriptive
statistics of variables used in equation (19) and (20) are given in Table 3 below.
4. Results and discussion
Microfinance competition can be used as an indirect evidence of mission drift. As stated
earlier, a commercial MFI, in the absence of subsidies and donations, can only achieve the
twin goals of sustainability and outreach if it earns more profits. But more profits
can either be earned by having more clients (which is possible only by charging a lower
price) or by charging a higher price for the products. Mark up pricing is a characteristic
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of non-contestable markets and is facilitated by interest inelasticity of microloans
(Khan, Shaorong & Khan, 2015). Lower prices (i.e., interest rate), on the other hand, will
attract more clients (being a characteristics of contestable markets) only if demand for
microloans is elastic. But as mentioned elsewhere (Khan, Shaorong & Khan, 2015), charg-
ing higher prices and retaining more clients are at odds with each other’s.
The contestability results based on equation (17) and (18) are given in Table 4.
The second column reports the contestability index value, which is the sum of the
three elasticities. A contestability value of 1 is interpreted as evidence of perfectly
competitive markets while negative values correspond to concentrated markets.
Column three and four report Wald test values. In column three, we test the null
hypothesis that markets in the particular country are contestable. In column four, we
do the same for markets in the particular country having monopoly power. The aster-
isk () above the t-value signifies the rejection of the particular null hypothesis at 1
percent level of significance. If both the null hypotheses are rejected, then we inter-
pret markets as monopolistic. As the table shows, only three out of 15 countries’
MFIs operate in a competitive environment. A quite significant number of the mar-
kets (i.e., 7 out of 15) can best be characterised as monopolies. Since firms are also
not necessarily price takers in monopolistic competition, thus the results of this
empirical study show that 80 percent of the MFIs enjoy some monopoly power and
hence can set their price over and above the market. In turn, mission drift is likely to
take place in most of the countries.
The results based on equation (19) and (20) are given in Table 5 and 6 respect-
ively. Note that various specifications of equation (19) are estimated using the fixed
effects methodology as recommended by the Hausman test statistics while equation
(20) is estimated using the random effects methodology suggested by the same test.
In Table 5, CS-FEM, PR-FEM and CS & PR-FEM stands for cross section-wise fixed
effect model, period-wise fixed effect model and both cross section and period-wise
fixed effects models respectively. Similarly, in Table 6, CS-REM and PR-REM stands
for cross section-wise and period-wise random effects models respectively. To save
space, only results related to the stated hypothesis are discussed below.
Hypothesis A The weak notion of sustainability will inevitably cause MFIs to focus on profit
maximisation for its own sake rather than increasing their depth and breadth of outreach.
For this hypothesis to be true, we mentioned that both c7 and c3 should be nega-
tive in equation (20), Table 6. While c7 is negative and statistically significant in
both cross section-wise and period-wise random effects specifications, c3 is positive
in CS-REM and negative in PR-REM. These results imply that while we have
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the variables.
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
ALS 1234.73 1681.30 4.04 28.61
PFB 0.65 0.26 0.01 1.17
AS 153425733.3 424654846.4 6.89 62.98
PM 0.053 0.89 11.24 257.03
CPB 187.56 227.95 5.99 76.99
NAB 179365.6 641983.75 7.29 59.63
LLR 0.02 0.03 5.01 49.29
CI 0.35 0.29 0.31 0.89
Source: Authors calculations using Eviews 10.
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statistical evidence that MFIs do not use their profits to increase depth of outreach,
we do not have conclusive evidence to comment on the impact of MFIs profits on
the breadth of outreach.
Hypothesis B MFIs are financially sustainable if they drift from their original mission.
To test hypothesis B using results from equation (19), the relevant parameter is
u4. As mentioned in section 3.3, and if hypothesis B is true, then u4 should be positive
in equation (19) when ALS is used as a measure of mission drift, and negative when
PFB is used as a measure of mission drift. Interestingly, the results of all the models in
Table 5 returns the expected sign and u4 is also statically significant in all the models.
Alternatively, to test hypothesis B using equation (20), the relevant parameters are c6
and c7. Again, if hypothesis B is true, then c6 should be positive and c7 negative in
equation (20). And again, the results in Table 6 for all models confirm the expectations.
Thus, we can safely conclude that financial sustainability/profit margins of MFIs are
directly associated with drifting from their original mission.
Table 4. Results of the Contestability analysis.
Country Contestability index
Wald test (t-value)
Remarksa1 þ a2 þ a3 ¼ 1 a1 þ a2 þ a3 ¼ 0
Pakistan 0.926981 0.407015 5.167030 Perfect Competition
India 0.543243 7.295766 8.677215 Monopolistic Competition
Bangladesh 0.313366 8.591947 3.921195 Monopolistic Competition
Nepal 0.238034 4.717974 1.473868 Monopoly
Kenya 0.20542 7.219330 1.230273 Monopoly
Cambodia 0.099322 10.35848 1.142272 Monopoly
Philippines 0.122482 6.621465 0.924212 Monopoly
Azerbaijan 0.58363 3.808265 5.338073 Monopolistic Competition
Bosnia & Herzegovina 0.866658 1.467701 9.539323 Perfect Competition
Tajikistan 0.194171 6.717903 1.618735 Monopoly
Bolivia 0.215383 9.068807 2.489451 Monopolistic Competition
Colombia 0.642366 2.013786 3.617060 Perfect Competition
Ecuador 0.054524 7.442060 0.429171 Monopoly
Nicaragua 0.593795 2.453580 3.586683 Monopolistic Competition
Peru 0.105739 7.314352 0.864864 Monopoly
Note: Results for all countries are based on Fixed Effects Estimation and are computed by the authors using Eviews 10.




CS-FEM PR-FEM CS & PR-FEM CS-FEM PR-FEM CS & PR-FEM
Constant (s) 48.952 166.875 85.491 0.681 0.743 0.684
AS (u1) 1.18E-06 7.80E-07 1.02E-06 3.20E-11 1.47E-10 2.15E-11
CPB (u2) 5.088 5.673 4.878 6.44E-05 0.0005 5.07E-05
NAB (u3) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 1.15E-08 9.52E-08 1.24E-08
PM (u4) 73.259 95.722 69.063 0.011 0.048 0.010
LLR (u5) 563.009 1607.52 193.55 0.141 0.719 0.118
CI (u6) 300.511 94.889 426.75 0.049 0.030 0.066
R2 0.87 0.75 0.87 0.89 0.27 0.89
F-Statistics 62.03 241.22 59.84 62.85 23.32 58.63
Hausman Test 34.839 14.411
Pearson Correlation between ALS & PFB: 0.443
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test: 0.023 (0.53)
Note: () and () implies statistical significance at 1% and 5% level respectively.
Source: The results are estimated by the authors using Eviews 10.
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Hypothesis C Drift from the original mission, in turn, is facilitated by the
market conditions.
To test hypothesis C, the relevant parameters are u6 and c5 in equation (19) and
(20) respectively. According to the postulates of equation (19), u6 should be negative
when ALS is used as a measure of MD and positive when PFB is used as a measure
of mission drift. The results, however, are mixed and none of the estimated u6 in any
specification is statistically significant. To test the same hypothesis using results of
equation (20), the parameter of interest is c5, and, if hypothesis C is true, then c5
should be negative. Results in Table 6 confirm that c5 is negative in both the specifi-
cation but is statistically insignificant. Thus, we do not have conclusive evidence,
either from equations (19) or equation (20), to accept hypothesis C as true.
5. Conclusions and recommendations
Soon after the advent of microfinance institutions, triggered by a general dearth of
subsidies and donations, MFIs around the world opted to go through a major
revamp. Initially, starting as welfarist institutions, most of the MFIs got transformed
into commercial entities seeking profit. A natural outcome of such a transformation
was the emergence of competition for clients and a drift from their original mission
of poverty alleviation. But despite such hidden repercussions, the proponents of the
commercial approach advocated the transformation by highlighting the positive side
in terms of financial sustainability.
The current work is an effort to test the validity of the claim that the twin goals of
sustainability and poverty alleviation can be achieved simultaneously. To this end, we
have collected data from the Mix Market database for a total of 158 MFIs from the
five continents for a period of 15 years. To evaluate the competitive environments in
various countries with respect to MFIs, we have utilised the Panzar and Rosse (1982,
1987) H-statistics. Using the panel data structure and Fixed Effect Model (FEM), the
estimation results indicate that 80 percent of the MFIs hold some market power and
can exert their influence on pricing. Since the theoretical discussion of section 3.1
implies that mission drift is directly associated with market power, hence it is likely




Constant (a) 0.38228 0.351
AS (c1) 3.72E-11 8.23E-11
ALS (c6) 6.09E-05 4.96E-05
CI (c5) 0.0628 0.041
CPB (c2) 0.0006 0.0005
LLR (c4) 4.3746 4.4574
NAB (c3) 1.47E-09 3.45E-08
PFB (c7) 0.292 0.262
Weighted R2 0.073 0.079
F-Statistics 15.63 16.94
Hausman Test: 6.589556
Note: () and () implies statistical significance at 1% and 5% level respectively.
Source: The results are estimated by the authors using Eviews 10.
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that majority of the MFIs are drifting from their original mission of poverty allevi-
ation and women empowerment.
Moreover, the study also tested three hypotheses related to sustainability, market
conditions and mission drift in the microfinance industry. For this purpose, we have
utilised data on 158 MFIs for the period of 2000–2015 from the Mix Market data set.
The regression techniques included a mix of fixed effects and random effects models.
The results indicate that the financial sustainability of an MFI is a direct function of
mission drift, and that it never translates into increasing the depth of outreach.
Similarly, although the results are not conclusive, we have some evidence on how
market conditions effect the incidence of mission drift.
Before any further elaborations of the findings, it would be fruitful to shed light
on some of the limitations of the study. In our view, the first limitation of the study
has to do with the limited number of MFIs selected for the study and the use of
unbalanced panel data. This limitation has been considered seriously but there was
no other alternative. We faced a trade-off between balancing the panel and the num-
ber of time series observations and hence a middle way is preferred. Secondly, the
proxies used for unit price of capital (UPC) and unit price of funds (UPF) are not
ideal but are the only proximate measures available in the Mix Market data set. Third
and last, we have used the contestability index as one of the explanatory variables in
equation (19) and (20). Since, there are only 15 countries in the sample, and that
contestability index is estimated for each country separately, hence we have a total of
15 observations on CI. Thus, CI is a type of dummy variable with fifteen categories.
While the use of CI in such a way is fine, it limits the use of more sophisticated
econometric techniques such as Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), Vector
Autoregressive Models (VEC) and cointegration techniques14.
Having these caveats in mind, let’s turn back to the results. The substantiation of
the first hypothesis means that financial sustainability (i.e., the weaker notion of sus-
tainability) does not translate into depth and breadth of outreach. This finding shed
serious doubts on the ‘win-win’ proposition of the financial system approach. The
only notable advantage of the financial system approach over the poverty-lending
approach is its financial sustainability, provided that it enables MFIs to extend their
depth and breadth of outreach. But our results suggest otherwise, and hence financial
system approach is no better than the poverty-lending approach in terms of outreach.
The verification of our second hypothesis suggests the same thing. That is, the
hypothesis states that financial sustainability and the social mission of alleviating pov-
erty and empowering women are at odds with each other. The two hypotheses jointly
suggest that pronounced focus on financial sustainability may be counterproductive
for achieving the social mission. Although partial, the verification of the third hypoth-
esis suggests that the magnitude of the above two effects depends on the mar-
ket conditions.
A closer look at these results imply that it is the acceptability of the weaker notion
of sustainability and the presence of market power that causes MFIs to drift from
their original mission. Hence, the recommendations of this study are straight forward;
a shift in focus from the weaker notion of sustainability to the broader notion of sus-
tainability. As noted in section 3.1, an MFI in any market structure will always ignore
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the social impacts of its functioning but damages to the society because of this ignor-
ance are at its minimum in perfectly competitive markets. Thus, to internalise the
social side of the calculus and to remove market inefficiencies, the state and the
donor agencies have a paramount role to play. Direct provision of microfinance serv-
ices has problems of its own, but the state and donor agencies can correct for the
ignored social impacts in the financial system approach through conditional subsidies
and grants. That is, donor agencies and the state should, ideally, tie grants and subsi-
dies with both depth and breadth of outreach of an MFI. Besides, the broader notion
of sustainability also implies that future research should aim on impact of MFI on
development, women empowerment and poverty reduction rather than on MFI ‘lost’
agenda and its sustainability.
Notes
1. For example, Rosenberg (2007) and Gonzalez (2010) reported that a good majority of the
commercialized MFIs charged markup rates well above the red zone proposed by
Yunus (2007).
2. Clients who are either reluctant to acquire loans against collaterals or those who lack
property to be held as collaterals by the commercial banks.
3. For example, advancing loans of greater denomination to less number of clients to save
on cost, or to have more male clientele than female.
4. To the best of authors’ knowledge, only Bhanot & Bapat (2015) is an exception who
constructed a sustainability index which covers financial as well as social sustainability.
5. Contemporary MFIs are providing a mixture of services but the focus here is on
microloans only.
6. Note that specifying and accepting the objective function of an MFI in this fashion is
synonymous to accepting that poverty alleviation or women empowerment is a secondary
goal for an MFIs. Although it is an acceptable specification for the proponents of
financial system approach, but they would also claim that more profits mean
greater outreach.
7. Since underproduction in the microfinance industry has direct implication for both
depth and breadth of outreach.
8. The function p in equation (9) could be interpreted as a social profit function where r l –
c(l,h) represent an MFI’s profit while h(h) represent the positive social impact of microcredit.
Moreover, h is introduced in the cost function because extending microcredit to un-bankable
clients involves risk of default and hence it is assumed that ocðl;hÞoh > 0 .
9. Note that the panel is not balanced because we have set the minimum time series
observations for an MFI to be 10 years while the maximum is sixteen years. Resultantly,
the minimum and maximum time series observations for an included MFI are 10 and 16
respectively.
10. Because a negative coefficient of PFB would imply that profit margin and PFB are
inversely related which would contradict profits being used for increasing depth of
outreach. Similarly, a negative coefficient on NAB would imply inverse relationship
between PM and NAB, contradicting the claims of profits being used for increasing
breadth of outreach.
11. A positive coefficient on PM when ALS is used as a measure of MD would mean that
PM and MD are directly related, and a negative coefficient on PM when PFB is used as a
measure of MD would necessarily means the same thing.
12. Again, the two parameters are estimates of impact of ALS and PFB (both measures of
mission drift) on PM and would definitely substantiate the hypothesis if the
restrictions hold.
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13. A given parameter should assume different sign with respect to the two measures of MD
(i.e., ALS and PFB) because the two measures are negatively correlated as reported in
table 5, and because increasing loan size and decreasing percentage of female borrowers
are considered as evidence of mission drift.
14. Inserting CI as an explanatory variable in the mentioned techniques causes
singularity problem.
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